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Keynote Address
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS (RET).
Let me begin by expressing my admiration for the work performed by Justice Elana Kagan, who now occupies the seat of the
Supreme Court that became vacant when I retired a few years ago.
She has written opinion after opinion, both for the Court and the in
dissent, which expresses my reaction to a particular issue that is far
more articulate and persuasive than anything that I might have written. The fact that she is performing so capably is particularly gratifying because it confirms my judgment that my retirement would
benefit the public as well as myself. Thanks to Elana, I have never
regretted my decision to retire. But as my former colleague, Bill
Rehnquist, often said, there are occasions when even “Homer nods.”
This morning, I plan to say a few words about one of those rare occasions—Chaidez v. United States,1 decided about two years ago.
Under the Supreme Court’s decision in Teague v. Lane,2 a person whose criminal conviction became final before the United States
Supreme Court announced a new rule of constitutional law may not
rely on that new rule as a basis for attacking his conviction. In
Chaidez, the Court held that under Teague the petitioner could not
rely on my opinion for the Court in Padilla v. Kentucky,3 as a basis
for challenging the validity of her plea of guilty to mail fraud
charges that subjected her to mandatory removal from the county.4
In Padilla, the Court had held that the defendant could challenge
the validity of his conviction because his lawyer gave him incorrect
advice about the deportation consequences of his plea.5 There was
nothing new about the basic rule that every defendant has a constitutional right to competent counsel before entering a plea of guilty.
1
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133 S. Ct. 1103 (2013).
489 U.S. 288 (1989).
559 U.S. 356 (2010).
Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1105.
Padilla, 559 U.S. at 360.
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But, according to the majority in Chaidez, our ruling in Padilla was
novel because we “resolved the threshold question before us by
breaching the previously chink-free wall between direct and collateral consequences” of criminal convictions.6 This morning I shall
make four brief comments about that “chink-free wall.”
First, unlike the Teague rule itself, as well as the constitutional
law rules to which Teague applies, the distinction between collateral
and direct consequences is the product of state court decisions,
lower federal court decisions, and law review articles. There are no
Supreme Court opinions endorsing the “chink-free wall” between
collateral and direct consequences. Indeed, the Court’s opinion in
Chaidez remains agnostic about the wall’s existence and even
acknowledged that the Court “had never attempted to delineate the
world of ‘collateral consequences.’”7
In an attempt to find support for the existence of this chink-free
wall, the Court’s opinion curiously relies on a law review article entitled Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Consequences of
Guilty Pleas by Gabriel Chin and Richard W. Holmes, Jr., for the
proposition that exclusion of advise about collateral consequences
from the Sixth Amendment’s scope was one of “the most widely
recognized rules of American law.”8 The Court’s reliance is curious,
in my view, because the article was critical of that distinction. The
Court’s citation is even more puzzling because I, too, had relied on
that article in my opinion for the Court in Padilla, but for a different
proposition: prevailing professional norms require counsel to advise
her client regarding the risk of deportation. The article thus illustrates how, in the unique context of immigration law, Strickland may
be applied even if there is a “chink-free wall” between collateral and
direct consequences.
Second, instead of “breaching” that wall, Part II of the Court’s
opinion in Padilla concluded that deportation was “uniquely difficult
to characterize as either a direct of collateral consequence” and
therefore the distinction as “ill suited” to evaluating the petitioner’s

6

Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1110.
Id. at 1108, n. 5.
8
See id. at 1109 (citing to Gabriel Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective
Assistance of Counsel and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV.
697, 706 (2002).
7
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claim.9 There is, of course, a clear difference between declining to
rely on a distinction and concluding that it must be changed. The
Court in Chaidez faults the Padilla opinion for fully explaining why
lower court doctrine was inapplicable instead of ignoring that precedent and simply discussing the Strickland standard.
Third, whether a particular consequence of a criminal conviction
is appropriately characterized as “direct” or “collateral” is far less
important than evaluating its impact on a particular individual. The
use of such a glittering generality as the basis for evaluating the
competence of any lawyer’s performance in a specific case is obviously unwise. My opinion in Padilla referenced a helpful amicus
brief filed by the Asian American Justice Center to illustrate this
point with real-world cases.10 For example, Maria Taganeca moved
to the United States from Fiji when she was seven years old. Maria
was enrolled in a community college and was taking care of her sick
relatives when she was arrested while driving with some friends, one
of whom had drugs in his possession. Although Maria did not have
drugs on her person, she was charged under state law with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Her attorney
advised her to plead guilty, without accurately informing her that
accepting such a plea would render her deportable. Thankfully, Maria was eventually spared deportation after lengthy legal proceedings, but her case epitomizes the importance of legal advice about
immigration consequences when a defendant is considering whether
to plead guilty.
Or, for a different view, consider the issue from the perspective
of a defense attorney. As Chin and Holmes point out, it is inconceivable that an attorney would make the following statement:
I represent someone charged with DUI, and due to
my excellent advocacy the prosecutor accepted a
guilty plea with a one-day sentence instead of the
three days imposed in almost every similar case. As
an interesting aside, my client and his family were
then deported based on the conviction; I have no idea
whether I could have negotiated a deal resulting in
conviction of a non-deportable offense; status as an
9
10

Padilla, 559 U.S. at 366.
See id. at 397, n. 7.
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alien does not affect the fine or length of incarceration, so I never considered it. The results of this case
demonstrate my remarkable legal abilities.11
As the hypothetical demonstrates, a competent attorney considers the real-world consequences of a defendant’s guilty plea and
should inform her client about the virtual certainty of deportation
following a guilty plea.
Fourth, as explained in Part I of the Court’s opinion in Padilla,
as well as Part I of the Court’s earlier opinion in I.N.S. v. St. Cyr,12
it is Congress, rather than the Judiciary, that is responsible for the
radical changes in our immigration law that have made deportation
a virtual certainty in many offenses.13 For most of the twentieth century, immigration law contained only a narrow category of deportation offenses and gave judges broad discretionary authority to prevent deportation. The rules in this area of the law suffer from the
same rigidity as the mandatory-minimum sentences that permeate
the federal criminal code. While the courts can require counsel to
provide adequate assistance to non-citizens facing potential deportation, only Congress can change the rules that create potential unfairness for literally thousands upon thousands of productive, but
non-voting, residents. If Congress were to re-introduce discretion
over removability decisions for judges or the Attorney General, the
importance of counsel’s advice about that possibility would no
longer be as essential as it is today.
To be sure, there is some force to the argument that applying
Padilla retroactively would potentially open the proverbial litigation
floodgates. But, however large that flood may be, it is the result of
Congress’s unwise decision to eliminate discretion in removability
proceedings. And, of course, only in meritorious cases will the noncitizens obtain relief. The fair administration of justice is never costfree.
Ultimately, I agree with the sentiment aptly expressed by Justice
Sotomayor in her Chaidez dissent: “In Padilla, we did nothing more

11
Gabriel Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel
and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 718 (2002).
12
533 U.S. 289 (2001).
13
Padilla, 559 U.S. at 361; see also St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 294–98.
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than apply Strickland.”14 Rather than announcing a new rule of constitutional law, we simply applied a familiar rule to the new set of
facts that were the product of changes enacted by Congress. If, instead of mandatory deportation, Congress were to impose a novel
form of punishment—perhaps something akin to the Philippine “cadena” described a century ago in the Weems15 case—I feel confident
that the Court would not characterize a decision requiring counsel
to advise her clients about the risk of that novel punishment as a
“new rule of constitutional law.” Advice about the novel punishment
of mandatory deportation is equally important.
Thank you for your attention.
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Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1120 (2013).
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 358 (1910).

